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RECENT CASES.
CARRIER-FARE-TICKETs-OPPoRTUNITY TO PROCURE-EJECTION OF PASSEN-
GERS.-PHILLIPS V. SOUTHFRN R. R. Co., 40 S. E. Rep. 268 (Ga.).-The defendant's
agent refused to sell the plaintiff a ticket, not knowing that the train would stop at
the plaintiff's destination. It being customary under like circumstances to charge
passengers without tickets no higher fare, the plaintiff refused to pay more, there-
upon being ejected from the train. Held, the defendant liable.
A common carrier, if they charge passengers without tickets a higher rate,
must first give them an opportunity to procure the same. Railroad Co. v. Rogers,
38 Ind. 116; Railroad Co. v. Rinard, 46 Ind. 293. A common carrier cannot dis-
criminate; Railroad Co. v. Park, 83 Ky. 51o.
CHINESE EXCLUSION-BURDEN OF PRoOF-SuFFIIENCY OF EVIDENCE.-U. S. v.
CHUN Hoy, iiI FED. 899 (HAwArI) .- Section 3 of the Geary Act places upon a Chi-
naman arrested for being illegally in this country the burden of proving affirma-
tively his right to remain. Held, an act of Congress raising presumption of guilt
is valid, and evidence of Hawaiian birth, insufficient.
This presumption should be viewed under rule of evidence as to facts pecu-
liarly within the knowledge of accused. Its harshness was due less to its intrinsic
nature than to penalty of section 4. Fong Que Ting v. U. S., 13 S. Ct. Rep. Io16;
In re Sing Lee, 54 Fed. 334. Section 4 held unconstitutional. U. S. v. Wong Dep
Ken, 57 Fed. 2o6. The mitigation of the penalty has removed objection to the rule.
Evidence of Hawaiian birth must be conclusive. Under 14 Amendment, law ex-
cluding immigrants is not applicable to Chinese person born in this country. Gee
Fook Sing v. U. S., 49 Fed. 146. Lee Sing Far v. U. S., 94 Fed. 834.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-ELEcTION BY LEGISLATURE OF ELECTION COMMISSION-
ERs-PowER TO CanATE BOARD To TRY ELECTION CONTESTS.-PaRAr V. BECKINEmIF,
65 S. W. REP. 136 (KY.) .- The appellant having been awarded the office of attor-
ney-general by a board of election commissioners, the appellee contested the decis-
ion, and the same commissioners, acting as a contest board, decided in his favor.
He brought suit to gain possession of office. Held, that the legislature had no
power to appoint a board of contest. Paynter, C. J., and Hobson and White, 3. J.,
dissenting.
Although in Stine v. Berry, 96 Ky. 63, it was held that the statute creating spe-
cial boards for the determination of contested elections was valid, this court favored
the reasoning that a board of contest exercises in all its elements judicial power,
and is therefore a court.
The whole judicial power of the State being expressly invested in the courts by
the constitution, the exercise of it by the legislature transcends that power, and
cannot be legally carried into effect, rames' Heirs v. Perry, 1o Yerg. 59; 30 Am.
Dec. 43o.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-MINING COAL-PAYMENT BY WEIGHT-.RIGHTS or COR-
PORAiONs.-WooDsoN v. STATE. 65 S. W. 465 (Am.).--Under the ordinary consti-
tutional provision that the powers granted a- corporation may be altered or revoked,
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"2 statute in so far as it requires a coal-mining corporation, where coal is mined and
-paid for by weight, to weigh the coal before screening, is not unconstitutional, as
restricting the rights of corporations to contract.
The power to legislate, founded upon such a reservation in a charter, is not with-
out limit, but is restricted by rights legitimately acquired by virtue of such charter.
Lothrop v. Steadrman. 42 Conn. 49o; Fed. Cas. No. 8514; Miller v. New York, 15
Wall. 498; 21 L. Ed. io4; Sheilds v. Ohio, 95 U. S. 319, 324; 24 L. Ed. 357, 359;
Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U. S. 721; 25 L. Ed. 502.
CONTRACTS-ILLEGAL CONDInoN-FIcTITIous SUIT-PuBLIc POLICY.-VAN HORN
v. KrrITAs COUNTY, 112 FED. I (WAsH.)-A county agreed to sell an issue of its
-bonds to a bidder on condition that he cause a feignfed suit to be brought and pros-
ecuted to the supreme court of the state, to determine the validity of the bonds
prior to their issuance. Action against the county to recover damages for breach
of this contract. Held, on demurrer, that the condition precedent is contrary to
public policy, and the contract, being indivisible, void.
Not only is such an attempt to secure a judicial opinion upon a question of law
-by means of a mere colorable dispute, involving no real controversy, a fraud on the
court, but a fair and exhaustive consideration of both sides of a question can rarely,
if ever, be had when both parties are united in interest. Lord v. Veazie, 8 How.
25xr; Smith v. Junction Railroad Co., 29 Ind. 546. The distinction between such a
suit and an "amicable" suit is sharply defined, the friendliness in the latter con-
sisting only in the manner of the proceedings, not in the absence of substantially
conflicting interests. 9 Encycl..Pl. & Prac. pg. 72o.
CORPORATIONS-INsLVENCY-PREFERENE-DIRECTRs.-SwIT & Co. v. DYR-
VEATCH Co., 62 N. E. 70 (IND.).-The Dyer-Veatch Co., a corporation, becoming in-
solvent, three of its directors who had become sureties on its notes payable to a
bank, mortgaged all the property of the corporation to said bank Held, that the
transaction is void in the absence of proof authorizing it on the part of a majority
of the directors other than those who were sureties, and that the creditors may
question the transaction. Wiley and Henley., J. J., dissenting.
The opinion rendered here and in the recent case of Nafbfannee Canning, Co. v.
Reid Murdock & Co., 6o N. E. io68, rejects the principles which have governed
the Supreme Courts of nearly all States and the U. S. Supreme Court. Sanford F.
& T. Co. tr. Howe, Brown & Co., 157 U. S. 312. The weight of authority sus-
tains an assignment by an insolvent corporation for the benefit of creditors even f
directors, provided only the debts are bona fide: but cf. Manufacturing Co. vt.
Hutchinson, 63 Fed. 96. It was held in the Canning Co. case, that a majority of
the directors must be disinterested. But this does not seem to be'good law.
CREDITORS-PREFERRED INTEREST ON CLAIx-PEoPLE v. AmERICAN LOAN & TRUST
Co., 73 N. Y. Sunp. 584.-After dissolution of defendant company, preferred creditors,
who had previously been receiving interest at less than the legal rate, were paid the
principal of their claims. They claimed interest at the legal rate from time of dis-
solution to settlement. Held, that they were entitled to the legal rate of interest
even though unpreferred creditors were thereby deprived of the principal of their
claims.
This case is unusual in that the preferred creditors had been receiving interest
at less than the legal rate. It was decided (In re Fay, 6 Miss. Rep. 462) that where,
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preferred creditors had been receiving no interest they were entitled to interest
from time of dissolution to time of settlement, in order of preference, although
other creditors were thereby entirely cut off. See also Upton v. Bank, 13 Hun. 269.
DAMAGEs-TELEGRAM--FAILURE To DLivWE.BuTLER V. WESTERN UNION TELE-
GRAPH Co., 4o S. E. Rep. 162 (S. C.)-This is an action brought against the de-
fendant for failure to deliver a telegram sent to a third person for plaintiff's benefit
Held, where a telegraph company failed to deliver a telegram sent by the son of
plaintiff to a third person for benefit of plaintiff, the latter has a right of action.
Where an agent without disclosing the name of his principal makes a contract
with a common carrier to transport the property of principal, the latter may main-
tain an action in his own name against the carrier to recover damages for the loss
of the property. Elkins v. Boston & Maine R. R. Co., zg N. H. 337.
DIVoRCE-JURISDICTION-DoMIcILE OF DEFENDANT.-WALLAcE v. WALLACE, 50
Am. REP. 788 (N. J.).-Complainant, deserted in one State moving into another
State for the purpose of securing a divorce in such State, acquired no domicile suffi-
cient to give the courts of such State jurisdiction, when no service is had on the
defendant in such State.
This point was not decided in the recent Supreme Court decisions on this sub-
ject, z8x U. S. i55-187, although the decision is a natural sequence of those cases.
The difficulty arises as to when, under such circumstances as above stated, the dom-
icile relied upon is matrimonial. This case lays down the rule hat 'necessity"
alone is the true ground for jurisdiction in such cases, as suggested in Bree v.
Bree, 181 U. S. 175, and Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U. S. 155. Many western juris-
dictions have, of course, taken the opposite view, but this seems to present a just
solution of the jurisdiction problem in such cases.
ELECTION OF OFFIcERS-CITy CoUNcIL-QUoRuM-REFUsAL To VoTE.-ScHmuz-
BACH ET AL. V. SPEIDEL ET AL., 40 S. E. REP. 424 (W. VA.) .- The defendants had
been elected as members of the board of public works, and had taken forcible pos-
session of the office and books. The plaintiffs, alleging illegality of election, peti-
tioned the court to compel defendants to restore the office and books to them.
Held, that a quorum of the city council being secured, though by unlawful means,
and a majority of those present voting for the persons elected, the election is valid.
Although a quorum was obtained by the aid of the police, yet the session was a
legal one, and its acts were valid. The right to compel attendance of absent mem-
bers is the recognized power of every lawfully organized legislative assembly.
Cush. Law & Prac. Leg. Assem. 3264.
EQUITY-MORTGAGE FoRcLoSURE-SALE TO EXECUTOR AS MORTGAGEE.-FLEMING
V. MCCUTCHEON, 88 N. W. 433 (MINN.).-Defendant, owner of a real estate mort-
gage, was appointed administrator of estate of mortgagor. While administrator
he foreclosed the mortgage, purchased the property at the sale, and subsequently
sold same at a profit. Action by the heirs-at-law to recover this profit. Held, that
the administrator had a legal and equitable right to foreclose and purchase, and
was not liable for the profits in the transaction. Brown, J., dissenting.
This case seems 'somewhat at variance with the general equitable rule that one
standing in a fiduciary relation purchasing at his own sale will be charged as con-
structive trustee at election of cestui que trust. Yost v. Crombie, 8 U. C. C. P.
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i59. But the court reasons that as the real property passed at once to the heirs-at-
law, and could be assets in the hands of the 'administrator only when taken posses-
sion of for the payment of debts, the administrator, therefore, did not occupy a fidu-
ciary relation to the property. Hill v. Mitchell, 5 Ark. 6o8; Noon v. Finnegan, 29
Minn. 418, 13 N. W. 197; Sloggy v. Dilworth, 38 Minn. 179, 36 N. W. 451; 8 Am.
St. Rep. 656.
The dissenting opinion protests vigorously against the decision of the court, and
holds that the profits of the transaction clearly belonged to the heirs-at-law. And
the weight of authority would seem to support this view. Foster v. Brown, 3 Rich.
L. (S. C.) 254; 1i Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, Io2o.
EVIDENcE-HEARSAY-COURT AND JURy.-IVES v. ELLIS Er AL., 62 N. E. 138 (N.Y.),
-Held, that letters setting forth opinions for or against one of the parties are inad-
missible as hearsay evidence, for the charge of the trial judge, that such letters be-
considered by the jury as merely showing a correspondence between parties and
statements therein be aisregarded, cannot destroy the prejudice already created.
O'Brien and Cullen, J. J., dissenting.
This decision is very important, in that it departs from previous rulings of New-
York courts and strict rules of evidence, and tends towards better and broader prin-
ciples of law. Gall. v. Gall, 114 N. Y. iog; Holmes v. Moffat, 12o N. Y. i59; Peo-
ple v. Priori, 164 N. Y. 469, hold the opposite view.
GAMING CONTRACT-PURCHASE FOR FUTUE DELIVERY-STATE STATUTE-
PUBLIC POLmc.-P.RxER ET AL v. MOORE, III FED. 470 (S. C.).-A South Carolina
statute declares void a contract for future delivery, unless it is the intefntion of
both parties that the article shall be delivered and received at tne date specified.
Held, that a broker advancing margins cannot recover from his principal who tes-
tifies that he did not intend an actual delivery, and that a state is final judge of its
own public policy.
The purpose of this statute is to destroy utterly dealing in "futures." It goes.
behind the acts to the sworn intention of the parties.
In determining what is public policy as regards the restraints of trade the court
limits itself to the constitution, laws, and judicial decisions of the State itself.
Safety in this pursuit lies only in avoiding general considerations, personal views
of political faith or religious dogma and following closely concrete opinion as form-
ulated in public law. Vidal v. Girard's Ex's., 2 How. x97; Swann v. Swann, 21 Fed.
299.
INSURANCE-CONDITIONS OF POLIc-SuIciDE.-LATIMER v. SOVEREIGN CAMP,
WOODMEN OF THE WORLD, 40 S. E. Rep. 155 (S. C.).-A benefit certificate was issued
by the defendant in favor of the plaintiff upon the life of her husband who died while
a member of said order.' The conditions of said policy having a direct bearing on the
facts in issue are, * * * (3) "death by the hand or act of the assured, whether sane
or insane; (4) death by the hand of the beneficiary, except by accident." The ques-
tion presented for the consideration of the court was, whether such policy with said
condition was void as against public policy.
Held, a clause in a benefit certificate excepting insurer from liability where in-
sured's death was caused by "his own hand or act whether sane or insane" is not
void as against public policy. McIver, C. J., and Gary, A. J., dissenting.
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Such a condition in a policy of life insurance is valid. If the assured commits
suicide, although at the time utterly bereft of reason, it is death by his own hand
or act within the meaning of the condition, and the policy is forfeited. De Gogorza
v. The Knickerbocker Life Ins. Co., 65 N. Y. 232.
INSURANcE-LiFE-GrFT-CcumSTANTAL EViDENCE.-LoRD v. NEW YORK Ln'E
INS. Co. ET AL., 65 S. W. 699 (Texas).-A brother made repeated statements to the
-effect that he had provided for his sister in event of his death, by a life insurance
policy, and said that a certain policy, payable to his estate, belonged to her. On one
occasion he gave a friend some papers in a.sealed envelope, requesting that they be
kept in a place of safety for him, and said that the envelope contained a policy for
his sister. Later the papers were taken away and put ifi the care of his bankers.
Held, that the evidence was sufficient to warrant a finding that he had given the
policy to his sister. Pleasants, J., dissenting.
Any act on the part of the owner of a chose in action, showing not only a per-
sistent intention to transfer, but that he regarded himself as having carried such inten-
tion into effect, is sufficient, and no written evidence of the transaction is required.
Malones Appeal, 38 Leg. Int. 303.
INSURANcE-RALROAD INjUIES-INDEMNITY-CONRACTCONSTRUCrION - IN
STANTANEOUS DEATH.-WORCESTER & S. ST. R. R. Co. v. TRAvFLEas INS. Co., 62 N. E.
Rep. 365.-A policy of insurance providing protection to railroad against its common
law or statutory liability to any person accidentally injured while traveling on same,
was held, not to include liability for instantaneous death of passenger. Morton and
Barker, J. J., dissenting.
The court had no authorities to follow'where a similar policy of insurance had
been construed. It is well recognized that there is a right of action for death from
accident. Adm'.r v. The S. N. E. Tel. Co., 72 Conn. 617. The court, however, de-
cided that this policy, while allowing compensation for injury which injured person
could have recovered himself, was not sufficiently broad to cover case of instan-
taneous death.
MANDAmUS-JURIsDIcIoN OF SUPREME COURT-FEE OF'STREETS--PEOPLE EX. 1m.
KocouREK V. CITy OF CHICAGo ET AL., 62 N. E. 179 (Ill.).-Held, that original juris-
diction of Supreme Court does not include mandamus suits seeking to compel a city
to remove a superstructure over a public alley, for a city, as a municipality, -does not
hold the fee of the streets in trust for the people of the State at large. Magruder, J.,
dissenting.
This decision is a direct departure from previous decisions of this court. In
McCartney v. Railroad Co., 112 Ill. 611; Stmith v. McDowell, 148 Ill. 51; Byrne v.
Railway Co., I69 Ill. 75, it was held that city holds fee of public streets in trust for
people of State at large. But the above decision seems to be founded upon sounder
law, following the line laid down in Hagaman v. Moore, 84 Ind. 496; State v. Newell,
go N. C. 7o5; Phillips v. Dunkirk, W. and P. R. Co., 78 Pa. 177.
MUNICIPAL CoRPoRATIoNs-BoND IssuE--CoNsTRUcTIor.-LETouRNEAu v. CiTy
OF DULUTH, 88 N. W. 529 (Minn.).-Chap. 351, Laws of Minn. provides that no city
council of any city shall issue bonds for any purpose, amounting to $iooooo or over
until such proposition t6 issue above that amount shall be approved by a majority
of the legal voters. Charter of the city of Duluth contains similar provision. City
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council issued improvement bonds amounting to $99,ooo. Action brought to restrain
council from further issue of bonds to the amount of $6oooo with approval of voters.
Held, that statute and charter allows council to issue bonds to any amount, less than.
$1oo,ooo for any particular purpose, although the aggregate issue of city bonds ex-
ceeds $iooooo. Collins and Brown, J. J., dissenting.
The court in construing this statute draws a very close distinction, which
appears to be contrary to the wording of the statute as set forth by the opinion of the
dissenting judges, but it is in line with the decision of the U. S. court. Chicot Co. v.
Lewis, I03 U. S. 495.
NUISANCE-CoNTnACTOs-PuBUC WoRI-DAMAGES.-BATES V. HoLimooK ET
AL., 73 N. Y. Supp. 417.-Defendants, being engaged on public work, placed their
machinery, without objection from the city authorities, on a park opposite plaintiff's
hotel, thereby greatly damaging him. Held, that contractors on public work should
not unnecessarily create a nuisance to neighboring property holders. Patterson, J.,
dissenting.
Official sanction of a nuisance must be express to justify an injury to private
property and special damage caused is actionable. Cogswel v. .R. R., 103, N. Y. xo;
R. R. v. Church, 1o8 U. S. 317. Contra, a properly authorized act, done carefully,
does not render the doer liable for the consequences. Exr's v. Mayor, 4 N. Y. 195.
And damage resulting from a permanent nuisance, operating under proper authority,
may be recovered. Morton v. Mayor, 65 Hun. 32.
RAmoADs IN STREET-CHANGE OF GRADE-LiAmnLITy To AnuTRas.-FmEs V.
N. Y. & H. R. Co., 68 N. Y. Supp. 67o.-Railroad Company was compelled by
law to erect and run cars over steel superstructure. Held, company was not liable
to abutting owners for injury to easements of light, etc., in absence of wording in
statute to that effect. Bartlett, Vann and Cullen, J. J., dissenting.
In ruling contrary to the recent case of Lewis v. N. Y. & H. R. Co. 16z-
N. Y. 2o2,the court seems to have gone against the weight of authority as also the
case of Story v. Railroad Co. go N. Y. 122, and Lehr v. Met. El. R. Co. 1o 4
N. Y. 291. An abutting owner necessarily enjoys certain advantages from the exist-
ence of an open street adjoining his property, and if they can be taken away and
directed to inconsistent uses by legislative authority, it seems as though it inaugurates
a system more nearly resembling legalized robbery than any other form of acquir-
ing property. Barnett v. Johnson, 15 N. J. Eq. 481; Codinan v. Evans, 5 Allen,
Mass., 311.
REPLEViN-AFFIDAVIT-APPEAL.-GERMAN NAT. BANK v. AULTMAN, MILIER &
Co., 88 N. W. 479 (Neb.).-In appeal of replevin suit to District Court, plaintiff had
filed a second affidavit enlarging on the first. Court, regarding this as superfluous,
and different from that filed first, struck it out. Plaintiff withdrew suit; but later,
moved for a new trial. Overruled, he asked for review on error. Held, that order
of district court striking out said affidavit was erroneous. Sullivan, J., dissenting.
The dissenting view is of some moment. At most, the District Court's ruling
was a harmless error, as said affidavit should have been regarded as an amendment.
Bank v. Ketcham, 46 Neb. 568. After pleadings had been filed in District Court, it
was too late for defendant to take advantage of any defects. 18 End. Pl. and Prac.
517; McKee v. Metraw, 3I Minn. 429. But plaintiff voluntarily refused to proceed.
Hence, it seems lacking in propriety to send him back to District Court to fortify a
probably impregnable position.
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STREET ASSESSMENT-INALIDTY-REFCOVERY BY TAXPAYER-DURESS-KNOWLEDGE
OF ILLEGALITY.-HAVEN ET AL V. MAYOR, ETC., 73 N. Y. Supp. 678.-The plaintiff
with knowledge of invalidity of a street assessment paid the same under protest, and
then sought to recover on grounds of duress and illegality. Held, that benefit by
improvement does not exclude right, but knowledge of illegality at time of payment,
though made under protest, prevents recovery.
A tax assessment has been regarded as similar to a judgment, the execution of
which could not be resisted, and should, therefore, be paid and if illegal be appealed
from and reversal obtained for error. Peyser v. Mayor, etc., 7o N. Y. 497. Thecourt now seems to regard this as true only where the taxpayer at the time of pay-
ing is ignorant of the facts establishing illegality.
TAXATION-BANK CAPITAL-ExEMPTION IN CHARTER-REs AmyUDICATA.-UNIoN
AND PLANTERS' BANK V. CITY OF MEMPHIS, III Fed. 561 (Tenn.).-Its charter pro-vided bank should pay the State "an annual tax of one-half of one per cent. on eachshare of stock subscribed, which shall be in lieu of all other taxes." In former suit
between same parties on like subject matter Supreme Court of Tenn. held bank liableonly for stipulated tax on its shares of stock. This decision was pleaded in estoppel
to suit for enjoining collection of taxes by city. Held, bank was not exempt from ad
valorem tax on its capital, and former decision, no bar.
Shares in hands of stockholders are exempt-divided court. Farrington v,.
Tenn., 95 U. S. 679;and also corporate capital, Memphis v. Hernando Ins. Co., 6
Bax. 527; contra Bk. of Com. v. Tenn., 104 U. S. 493; Shelby Co. v. U. and P. Bk.,
161 U. S. x49. Bank building alone is exempt, not collateral holdings of real
estate, surplus profit, nor corporate capital.
The adverse adjudication of demand for a tax is an estoppel to demand for sametax for other years. So. Pac. R. Co. v. U. S., 168 U. S. I. Such estoppel not allowed
by usage of Tenn., hence held no bar, as U. S. court gives a judgment no greater
efficacy than State court allows. This precise question seems not to have arisen here-
tofore.
TAXATION-FRANCHISE TAX-PATENT RIGHTs.-PEOPLE EX REL U. S. ALUMINUM
PRINTING Co. v. KNIGHT, 73 N. Y. Supp. 745. The comptroller, in determining the
franchise tax of a corporation, included in the appraised capital the value of certain
patent rights owned by them. Held, that patent rights, being non-taxable, are
excluded from such assessment. Smith, J., dissenting.
This is exactly contrary to the decisions of the same court in People v. Wemple,
61 Hun. 53 and People v. Campbell, 138 N. Y. 543, which on the authority of People
v. Insurance Co., 92 N. Y. 328, held that patent rights could be included in capital
stock for assessment purposes, on the ground that the franchise tax was upon thefranchise alone and not upon the investment. But there is a tendency to disregard
this distinction in the later cases of People v. Assessors, 156 N. Y. 417, and Johnson
Co. v. Roberts, 159 N. Y. 70, and to hold federal grants of privileges exempt from
any assessment.
WARRANTY-HEARSAY.-IVES v. EwIs, 62 N. E. 138 (N. Y.) .- An action
for the breach of an express warranty in the sale of an alleged ancient docu-
ment. The defendant offered in evidence a letter written by him to the plaintiff,
containing the opinion of experts, which plaintiff had requested fifteen months afterpurchase, as to the genuineness of said document. Held, there was error in admit-
ting it. O'Brien & Cullen, J. J., dissenting.
The diversity of opinion regarding the admissibility of this letter, is due to theobvious distinction between its contents and the relevancy of its writing to the issue
of warranty. Though admitted to show compliance with the plaintiff's request, and
though the jury was charged to disregard its contents, Parker, C. J., held that the
error was not cured, citing People v. Schooley, 43 N. E. 536; Holmes v. Moffat, 24N. E. 275. O'Brien, J., dissenting, held the seeking of expert opinion to be irrecon-
cilable with the claim of a warranty, and that the error was cured. Landon, J.. cons
curring, held the claim of a warranty and the seeking of expert opinion, not to be
inconsistent.
